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The defense of the United States today is based on the
Total Force concept — including a combination of active duty
and reserve forces in being which provide for the security
structure essential during national crisis. However, the
Naval Reserve forces have been continually attacked and
reduced in size over the past ten years. Is this continual
reduction totally justified? An analysis of the costs to
maintain a Reserve Seabee relative to an active duty counter-
part suggests that it costs seven times more to pay, train
and support the latter. While trained to meet specialization
and conditional requirements, the Reserve Seabee benefits
both civic and other military organizations with contributed
labor, completing many construction projects during the
year. The positive benefits at lower cost make the Reserve
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From the very beginning of United States Naval history,
Naval Reservists have played an important part in the success
of the United States Navy. During the Revolution, there was
no regular Navy, of course so that everyone was in effect a
reservist. Thus began a tradition which has seen the Naval
Reserve augment and support the regular Navy forces in every
major conflict throughout our history up to the present time.
The Naval Reserve has served to prevent conflict as well.
Carl Vinson, then House Armed Services Committee Chairman,
had much praise for the Reserves ordered to active duty as
a result of the Berlin crisis and pointed out that they had
been mobilized "to prevent war — not to fight a war. They
were called to meet the crisis and it is to their everlasting
credit that they met that crisis head-on." Naval Reservists
continue to figure prominently in our country's overall
defense posture and strategy.
Nonetheless, the Naval Reserve has found itself being
continually attacked in recent years. The fiscal year 1973
defense funding included money for 129,000 Reserve pay billets,
but successive cuts reduced that number to 96,500 for fiscal
Strivers, R.E., Privateers and Volunteers, Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis, 1975.

year 1977. The fiscal year 1979 budget request submitted
to Congress by the Carter Administration contained funding
for only 52,000 billets. It is likely that Congress will
compromise, authorizing final totals somewhat higher than
those requested, but probably lower than the fiscal year
1978 level of 87,000 pay billets.
At least part of these cuts can be attributed to a continu-
ation of previous Navy and Defense Department budgetary
neglect of the Naval Reserve. In a speech at a Reserve
Supply Corps seminar several years ago, Vice Admiral Pierre
Charbonnet, Jr., then the Chief of Naval Reserve, conceded
that "There was a form of, if you will, 'benign obscurity'
that engulfed our reserve. It was on the backburner of Navy
planning. And although recognized and appreciated, it was
never to be considered a full partner in the allocation of
2
money, hardware, construction, or management resources."
Another substantial portion of these cuts can be attributed
to an overall reduction in the prosperity of the regular Navy.
As inflation and an increased demand for the federal dollar
in other areas have forced a more austere environment on the
Navy, so too has the Naval Reserve experienced a gloomy
monetary atmosphere. It has always been a natural phenomenon
for even larger cuts to be made in the second-echelon levels
2Hessman, James, "Background for the Future of the Naval
Reserve," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 197 8.

which are less vulnerable than the main defense budget.
Thus, those looking for budget reduction opportunities
believe and advocate that the United States is spending too
much on its Reserve Forces. No perceptible consideration
seems to be given to the benefits accruing from the dollars
expended on the Naval Reserve especially in comparing cost
benefits of other programs developed for national security
reasons
.
B. PURPOSE AND APPROACH
It is the purpose of this paper to analyze in detail the
cost to train a Naval Reservist for duty with a Seebee
Company . . . and hopefully to examine some of the benefits
related to this investment in training and military reserve
activity. Owing to the variety and complexity of the Naval
Reserve components (air, surface, supply, etc.,), and due to
academic time constriants, it was deemed necessary to restrict
the study area to one example. The Naval Reserve Seabee
has been chosen as the subject of this paper, both because
of certain unique features of his training and because the
Reserve Seabees have a unique command structure outside the
Reserve Readiness Command setup.
Chapter two gives a brief history of the United States
Naval Reserve with an emphasis on the Reserve Seabees.
Particular attention is given to the total force concept now
applied to the Naval Reserve and the impact it has had on the
organization and its operation. The Reserve Seabee organization
10

and command structure is explained in preparation for the
detailed discussions which follow.
The approach used in the cost studies of chapter three
is to analyze all costs of training and maintaining a Reserve
Seabee. Included are pay and allowances, week-end and readi-
ness duty (two-week.) training and the costs to support a
Seabee through established Naval Reserve Centers and Perman-
ent Drill Sites. The emphasis then shifts to a close look,
at the same costs required to keep a regular Seabee on active
duty. Chapter four rounds out the study by considering a
number of intangible factors including the benefit of having
a unit in a high degree of readiness in case of conflict and
the community benefits realized as by-products of Seabee
training. Also considered are benefits accruing to the Navy
from a Seabee ' s background in the civilian construction




II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF THE NAVAL RESERVE
A. NAVAL RESERVE BEGINNINGS
The history of the United States Naval Reserve has run
parallel to that of the regular Navy itself and has been
interwoven with one overriding fact — that in time of war,
the Navy has been augmented and reinforced by men who were
already trained for land, air and sea assignments. The first
United States Navy formed during the revolution was composed
entirely of reservists. However, after the first regular
Navy was formed during John Adams' presidency, the Navy was
able to get along adequately with its regulars, those men
who were career-minded professionals. This tendency to rely
on its own resources may have stemmed less from the Navy's
need for manpower than from the horrible prospect of dealing
with the militia of the day. These nonvoluntary militia
units had been a disaster and an embarrassment to the Army
and the Navy wanted no part of them. However, independent
though it wished to be, the Navy had only limited success in
filling its ranks through its recruiting. When Congress
authorized an increase in Navy manpower from 7500 men to
10,000 men for the Mexican War, the Navy was never able to
recruit more than 8,000 men at any one time. This problem
seems to have been the result both of poor Navy personnel
policies and the widely held notion of the day that the
glamour and glory of war belonged to the soldier. Not much
12

thought was given to the Navy's role in the War and the
Navy did not effectively speak for itself.
At the outbreak of the Civil War in 18 61, there were
about 1,400 Navy officers, about 3 00 of whom resigned imme-
diately to join the Confederate Forces. Lacking manpower
and faced with dim prospects of recruiting regulars, the Navy
had to rely heavily on volunteers — Reserves, if you will —
to fill its ranks. As a result, about 7,500 volunteer offi-
cers were received into the Navy. At first, most of these
were professionals — men who worked the lakes, rivers and
oceans in their civilian trades. But later many were ordinary
landsmen who were trained to do a wartime job. A similar
situation prevailed within the enlisted ranks. At the beginning
of the War, there were only about 7,600 enlisted men to which
were added about 100,000 volunteers. The volunteer Reserves
were the backbone of the Navy during this period. At the
end of conflict, most of these volunteer enlisted men and
officers returned to their homes and civilian jobs, leaving
the Navy once again comprised almost entirely of career-minded
regulars.
For the next twenty years, the Navy was so concerned with
its own survival that it showed no interest in a Naval Reserve,
forgetting the important part the Naval Reservists had played
Strivers, R.E., Privateers and Volunteers , Naval
Institute Press, Annapolis 1975.
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during the Civil War. However, with the Naval revival of
the 1880' s, a number of Naval officers and civilians began
to see the need for some form of reserve force. In the
absence of Federal Government action, the states formed
their own Naval Militia. Massachusetts took the lead,
forming its militia in 1888. Many other states followed and
supported their militia with ships of their own. For exam-
ple, the California Naval Militia had the use of the small
cruiser Marblehead . The uses for these naval militia were
never really established — some saw them purely for coastal
defense, others as supplements to the regular Navy — until the
war with Spain in 1898. In all, about 4,000 naval militia
were sent by their states to augment the 15,000 officers and
men of the Navy. These reservists served in both coastal
defense and in fighting ships off Cuba.
When the War ended and the militia departed, the Navy
saw the need for an organized Federal Naval Reserve and for
the first time began pressing Congress to establish such a
group. But Congress was slow to act and the state naval
militia continued until after World War I. However, in 1912,
Congress established a naval medical reserve corps and followed
with the piecemeal establishment of other reserve groups
until a law passed on 29 August 1916 formed the Naval Reserve
Force.
There was barely time for this Reserve Force to become
organized, since the United States entered World War I only
14

a few months later. Once again, the Reserve strength proved
invaluable to the Navy in meeting its wartime mission. The
still-active state militia provided about 13,000 officers and
men while the new Naval Reserve Force provided another 33 0,0 00
officers and men. Almost all the Navy's aviation and all
12,000 women in the Navy were Reservists. It was one of the
ironies of the war that the Reservists, assigned to the
submarines and other smaller craft, saw most of the action
while the Navy regulars, being assigned to the larger comba-
tants, saw very little. To a very large extent, history
repeated itself in WW II with reservists manning as much as
95% of the most dangerous sea and air assignments.
The Navy, and consequently the Naval Reserve, fell upon
hard times after World War I. The state naval militia were
abandoned, but finally legislation in 1925 established the
air reserve and revitalized the entire Naval Reserve estab-
lishment. By 1938, there were 11,000 officers and 13,000
men in the United States Naval Reserve.
This healthy growth of the Naval Reserve barely preceded
the dramatic buildup of the Navy for World War II. The
Naval Reserve began to report for duty as early as 1940,
thereby sparing the Navy of depending on the draft for personnel,
Not until after Pearl Harbor did any draftees enter the Navy
and even those were enlisted as members of the United States
Naval Reserve. The Navy grew to three million during this
period. Of the 320,000 officers on duty in 1945, all but
15

approximately 13,000 were Reservists. These figures point
out rather explicitly the important role which the Naval
Reserve played in the course of World War II.
It has only been since demobilization from World War
II that the Naval Reserve had come into its own, ready to
assume a role as a full partner with either the peacetime or
wartime regular Navy. Naval Reserve Training Centers were
built all over the country and the Naval Air Reserve Training
Command was established in Glenview, Illinois. For the first
time, regular Navy ships were assigned to Reserve training
duty. One of the most important programs instituted during
this post-war period was a massive recruiting effort which
brought thousands of veterans and men too young for World
War II into the Reserve. In 1948, this period of favorable
growth was climaxed by the signing by President Truman of a
bill providing retirement benefits for Reservists.
The tremendous growth and maturity of the Naval Reserve
during this post-war period played an important part in the
Reserve's ability to meet the challenge of the many conflicts
which have faced our nation since World War II. After pro-
viding some 2,000 Reservists to aid in the Berlin Airlift,
the Reserve was again ready to do its part during the Korean
War, ultimately providing 23 percent of the enlisted men and
60 percent of the officers who served in that War. Praising
the performance of the Naval Air Reserve during this War,
Vice Admiral H. M. Martin, then Commander of the Naval Air
16

Force, Pacific Fleet, said, "Never before has our country
. . . . . 4
realized such dividends from a peacetime training program."
In recent years, the Naval Reserve has continued to play
an important role in the country's defense, but that role
has taken on a changing character. During the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962, President Kennedy used several thousand
Reservists who were on their annual training duty to augment
the regular forces. This allowed the President considerable
flexibility in using the country's armed forces without the
provocation of an all-out callup. Likewise, in the Vietnam
War, many Reservists were called to active duty to augment
the regular Navy, but this time, many of them saw little
action, usually serving in stateside desk jobs. This switch
to the "domino theory" of troop deployment allowed the more
highly trained forces serving outside the war zone to augment
troops already in the War. The Reservists, while seeing a
minimum of actual combat, had nonetheless fulfilled an
important mission for the war effort by freeing regular Naval
personnel.
B. BIRTH OF THE SEABEES
Although there are many examples in Navy history when
sailors with building skills were used to do construction work





that the Seabees were born as an integral unit of the United
States Navy. It was a birth of necessity. During the buildup
of overseas bases which preceded the War, the Navy had
followed its long standing policy of contracting the con-
struction activity to civilian firms who used their own
civilian employees on the job. However, as the Germans in
Europe and the Japanese in the Pacific began to expand their
empires, the undesirable effects of this policy became evi-
dent. By law, civilians in war zones are not allowed to make
any resistance; to so do is to designate themselves as
guerrillas and risk immediate execution (some civilian workers
were in fact executed) . Additionally, these civilians lacked
the military training and expertise to make any significant
resistance.
Recognizing the need for military construction units,
the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, Admiral Ben
Moreell, organized support for and received permission to
form in 1942 three construction battalions, the purpose of
which was to construct advance base facilities while resisting
enemy operations. These Seabees then, were fighting
construction men.
Because emphasis was placed on recruiting men from the
construction fields, the first Seabee units were highly
skilled volunteers. Later in the War, however, men of few
or no skills were enlisted and had to be completely trained,
both professionally and militarily. These men were even-
tually organized into 190 construction battalions which
18

deployed to all military fronts and built more than 400
advanced bases, some of which were large enough to house
50,000 men. In addition, the Seabees participated in almost
every amphibious assault, assembling pontoons and causeways
and handling ship offloading. The Seabees, although a new
organization, became highly respected for their invaluable
contribution to the War effort.
After World War II, the Seabees were demobilized along
with the rest of the armed forces and dwindled to only 2,800
men by June 19 50. However, this post-war period, being one
of considerable growth for the Naval Reserve, saw the organi-
zation of the Reserve Seabees as a complement to their active
duty counterparts. These Reserve Seabees were mostly World
War II veterans who contributed a great deal of experience
and professionalism to the fledgling units . By the time the
Korean War erupted in 1950, these Reserve Seabees, although
small in numbers, were able to assist substantially in the
rapid expansion of the small active Seabee forces which were
necessary for the War. The experience and leadership pro-
vided by these veteran Reserves enabled the Seabees to
accomplish major construction projects and to carry out
support of amphibious operations for the War.
Since the cold war had created a necessity to maintain
military strength and preparedness, there was no rapid
Naval Construction Forces Manual, p. 315, February 1978
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demobilization at the end of the Korean War. The Seabees
remained strong as did the Reserve Seabee organization.
However, their mission turned to one of peacetime construction
and humanitarian relief. While the active duty Seabees built
bases all over the world including the Cubi Point Naval Air
Station in the Philippines and the installation of the first
Nuclear Reactor Power Plant at McMurdo Station in Antarctica,
the Reserve Seabees concentrated on preparing their mobili-
zation readiness through a structured training program, much
of which consisted of Self-Help habitability and Community
Service projects.
These peacetime projects and training gave valuable
practical experience to both the regular and Reserve Seabees
which prepared them for the role they were to play in the
Vietnam War. The first Seabee battalion arrived in Vietnam
on 7 May 1965. As the War escalated, all active duty batta-
lions were rotated to service in Vietnam and nine battalions
were reactivated. This buildup culminated in 196 8 in the
call to active duty of two Reserve Construction Battalions
.
These units, being mobilization ready and highly trained, were
able to deploy to Vietnam and to produce results almost
immediately with a minimum of disruption to the shore estab-
lishment or the active forces . When these two units were
sent back to inactive status over a year later, they had
again proven that the Reserve Seabees were ready to perform
as an integral part of this country's armed forces.
20

C. TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT AND THE RESERVE SEABEES
The defense of the United States in the 1970' s and 1980'
s
continues to rely heavily on the Naval Reserve through the
"Total Force Program". Under this concept, future buildup
of military forces during national crises will come from
manpower and assets of the Reserves without the immediate
recourse to the selective service system unless Congress
reinstitutes the draft. The rationale behind this policy is
to protect the country with forces in being while minimizing
the cost to the taxpayer. The emphasis is a total management
and integration of the active and Reserve forces to maximize
the combat capabilities of the total force. This idea has
prevailed in our Reserve structure in the past but management
of it was lacking. Today's Reserve is structured so as to
work alongside its active duty partner.
In keeping with this precept, the Reserve Seabee organi-
zation has command responsibility to the Chief of Naval
Reserve, who administers the entire Naval Reserve Program.
Figure 1 shows the organization chart of the Seabee Reserve.
The Commander, Reserve Naval Construction Force, administers
the eight Reserve Construction Regiments and the seventeen
Reserve Construction Battalions as well as various public
works and Construction Battalion Center augment units. It
is interesting to note that this organization is self-contained
and separate from the other Reserve organizations who have
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around the country. The Seabees receive only administrative
support from these REDCOMS. The Seabees, therefore, operate
identically and work very closely with the Commander, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, who is the technical program
manager for the Seabee Reserve. Working together so closely
in this manner, the two organizations, both active and
Reserve, are better able to plan the readiness and capabilities
of the total Construction Force.
Units of the Reserve Construction Force conduct inactive
duty for training (weekend drills) at the detachment level
at various Naval Reserve Training Centers and at the battalion
level at designated battalion Permanent Drill Sites (PDS)
.
These PDS's house portions of an active duty equipment and
tool allowance which are utilized in readiness training.
The two-weeks Active Duty for Training periods are usually
conducted on the regimental level at one of the Construction
Battalion Centers. During all periods of training, the
Reserve Commanding Officers of each battalion exercise full
staff operational control and are responsible for attainment




III. COSTS OF TRAINING RESERVE AND ACTIVE DUTY SEABEES
A. UNAFFORDABLE LUXURY OR BARGAIN?
Costs are usually the main reason behind proposed reduc-
tions of the Reserve. Harold W. Chase, Deputy Assistant
Defense Secretary for Reserve Affairs, while testifying
before the Senate Armed Services Committee ' s Manpower and
Personnel Subcommittee, admitted that cost reduction is the
reason for proposed cuts in the 1979 Reserve budget, saying,
"The move would save $60 million and is a judgment call."
In absolute terms, the cost to maintain the Reserve is con-
siderable. For fiscal year 1977, the Department of Defense
estimate of personnel costs alone for the six Reserve and
National Guard components was in excess of $1,639 million.
It is apparent that the Reserve budget is a substantial expen-
diture which deserves careful control and consideration.
But at the same time, it is argued that the Reserve is a wise
investment. Proponents of a strong Reserve point out that
it would cost many times more were the 900,000 officers and
men of the Reserve Force on active duty. The Reserve is a
bargain, they argue.
Just how much of a bargain is the Reserve Seabee? This
study now turns to a comparison between the costs of training
a Reserve Seabee and one who is on active duty. To keep the
comparison pure, an E-6 Petty Officer with over 10 years of
service has been chosen as the typical Seabee and will be used
24

as the basis for both parts of the study. It is also assumed
that he is married with dependents.
B. COST ANALYSIS OF TRAINING A RESERVE SEABEE
The costs involved in maintaining a Reserve Seabee are
of three basic types: pay and allowances, training expenses,
and support costs. Perhaps the most obvious of these is pay
and allowances, which, for all Reservists, are derived from
two sources. He is allowed forty-eight paid drills per year
plus a seventeen-day period of annual active duty for training
(ACDUTRA) . During both these periods of service, he receives
a regular salary plus a basic allowance for quarters (BAQ)
.
There is no allowance for subsistence as meals are provided
for him at the Naval Reserve Training Center, the Permanent
Drill Site or the ACDUTRA site. The fiscal year 197 8 daily
drill pay rates (each drill is considered one day) for an
E-6 Reservist with over 10 years service is $24.94 base pay
and $6.74 BAQ. These rates also apply to the seventeen-day
period of ACDUTRA. Figure 2 shows the calculations for his
yearly pay and allowances, the total of which is $2,059.20.
Figure 2





















Although the Reservist does not receive an allowance for
his subsistence cost, there is nonetheless a cost to feed him
while he is in a drill status and on ACDUTRA. The Reserve
Seabee drills one weekend each month and is provided lunch
on both Saturday and Sunday. Thus he is fed a total of
twenty-four days a year. The current Navy Subsistence Office
rate per day is $2.40 or $57.60 per year for drill periods.
While on ACDUTRA, the Naval Reservist subsists in the dining
hall at his ACDUTRA site at an allowable cost of $3.02 per
day. The cost to feed him for the entire seventeen-day
period is $51.34. His yearly subsistence cost then is $103.94.
The expense of training a Reserve Seabee is a substantial
portion of his maintenance costs. This is not surprising
since he receives training at three different locations during
the year. He is attached to a Naval Reserve Training Center
at which he must perform a minimum of twenty-five drills.
The other twenty-three required drills are then spent at
his battalion Permanent Drill Site. A third location is
required for him to complete his ACDUTRA training. The
expenses at each of these locations is calculated in Figures 3,
4 and 5. In each of these Figures, the Administrative Cost
category includes administrative and consumable supplies,
telephone expenses, vehicle maintenance and similar items.
Both operating costs and civilian personnel costs are actual
budgeted figures for fiscal year 197 8 while the number of
Reservists served at the Naval Reserve Training Center is
26
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NAVAL RESERVE TRAINING CENTER
Operating Costs:

















Grand Total $ 404,168.14
Number of Reservists Served 400
Average Cost Per Reservist $ 1,010.4 2
approximate since the number fluctuates throughout the year.
Military personnel expenses have been figured using authorized
allowances costed at the Composite Standard Military Rates
given in NAVCOMPT Manual, Volume 3, paragraph 035750. The
costs of the Naval Reserve Training Center are those of the
Center in Phoenix, Az. It is typical of the many Reserve































































$588,312 $ 92,943 $681,255
Civilian Personnel Costs
Military Personnel Costs:
Pay Grade No. Annual Rate
















Number of Reservists Served
































el to and from ACDUTRA 900,000
lian Personnel Costs -0-
Military Personnel Costs -0-
Grand Total $1,237,100
Number of Reservists on Training 14,552
Average Cost Per Reservist $ 85.04
Each of the seventeen Reserve Seabee battalions has its
own Permanent Drill Site, the locations of which are enumerated
in Figure 5. The expense of operating these sites is two-fold.
Each battalion receives an annual operating target which
finances the administrative costs and maintenance of the
site. In addition, a support agreement is negotiated with
most host activities to pay for utilities and other services
provided to the sites. There are no civilian personnel at the
PDS ' s but each has a complement of active duty Navy men to
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assist in training and to man the site between drill weekends.
The costs of all the sites is totaled and divided by the
approximate number of officer and enlisted Reserve Seabees
to get an average cost, a procedure which eliminates regional
costs differences.
The five ACDUTRA sites used by the Reserve Seabees are
listed in Figure 5. A support agreement is negotiated with
the host location to cover the cost of some training received,
supplies used and utilities furnished. The agreement also
includes a portion of each location's overhead, into which
is added the civilian and military personnel costs of the
base. Thus no separate personnel costs are shown. An addi-
tional cost for ACDUTRA is the expense of transporting
personnel from their homes or Reserve Centers to the ACDUTRA
site. This cost for fiscal year 1978 is estimated to be
$900,000. The $85.04 ACDUTRA training cost brings to
$1,232.55 the total of training a Reserve Seabee for fiscal
year 1978.
The remaining category of Reserve Seabee maintenance
costs is for support of the Reserve Regimental and Brigade
staffs within the Seabee organization. Each Reserve Regiment
receives an operating target with which it purchases adminis-
trative and office consumables . They have no other office
support costs since they are located in various Naval Reserve
Centers around the country; nor are there any additional
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the Regiments and their costs. Figure 7 shows the costs of
the First Reserve Naval Construction Brigade, which adminis-
ters the entire program from its offices in Kansas City, Mo.
In addition to administrative and utility costs, this office
has both civilian and active duty Navy personnel who assist
the Reserve staff in administering the program. The total
support cost for both staffs is $46.23 which, when combined
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brings the total maintenance costs for an individual Reserve
Seabee to $3,446. 92. 6
All cost data was obtained from the NAVCOMPT Form 2171,
Budget Classification/Functional Category/Expense Report —
COMFIRSTRNCB and the NAVCOMPT Form 2199; Trial Balance -
COMFIRSTRNCB, both produced monthly by the Navy Regional
Finance Center, San Diego.
32

C. COST ANALYSIS OF TRAINING AN ACTIVE DUTY SEABEE
The costs to maintain a Seabee on active duty fall into
the same three basic categories as those for a Reserve
Seabee. As is the case in the previous cost analysis, the
pay and allowance category is the largest of the three. An
E-6 Petty Officer with over ten years active service receives
$748.20 per month in base pay and a BAQ allowance of $202.20.
For purposes of this study, it is assumed that he is not
authorized to receive a separate ration allowance, but rather
is required to subsist in the Navy general mess while on duty.
In addition, active duty enlisted personnel receive a monthly
clothing allowance, the amount of which is $8.10 for an E-6.
(A Reservist does not receive this allowance.) For the
entire fiscal year, the total pay and allowances received
by the active duty E-6 Seabee is $11,502.00.
Even though the E-6 Petty Officer addressed in this study
does not receive a subsistence allowance, it nevertheless
costs the Navy to feed him while he is on duty. The present
Seabee spends approximately five months, or twenty-two weeks,
of each year in his battalion's home port. It is assumed
that during this time, he will eat breakfast and lunch in
the general mess five days a week, or a total of 110 days.
The current allowable daily rate for breakfast and lunch is
$1.81. (This rate is the amount that the general mess is




it will cost the Navy approximately $199.10 to feed him during
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this period. The cost is greater during the other thirty
weeks that his battalion is deploying overseas. Since he
is away from home, it is assumed that the average Seabee eats
all three meals each day in the general mess. The deployed
rate of $3.12 per day amounts to $651.00 for the 210 day
period the Seabee is away from homeport. The annual cost
to feed an active duty Seabee, therefore, is $850.10.
The active duty Seabee receives all of his training
through his battalion, which undergoes intensive exercises
while in homeport. During deployment, the battalion under-
takes numerous construction projects, all of which give the
Seabee valuable on-the-job training. There are also some
specialized schools utilized during the homeport period which
are paid for out of battalion funds. . Most of the cost of
operating a battalion, therefore, is in the nature of training,
the remainder being for administrative support costs. For
clarity and convenience, the entire battalion operating target
is considered training. Rather than examining only one
battalion's funds, the cost of operating all four battalions
serving under the Commander, Construction Battalions, Pacific
(CBPAC) is used to determine the average cost per Seabee.
This procedure is thought to eliminate the bias inherent in
the fact that each battalion receives different target amounts.
A more representative average results. Figure 8 shows the
calculation of this average. The battalions have no civilian
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battalions has been purposely omitted so as to ensure a
similar comparison between the total active duty battalion
costs and those of a reserve battalion, which also omitted
the personnel cost of the reserve members
.
The active duty battalions have a support structure very
similar to that of the Reserve Seabees . There are two
Regiments serving under CBPAC who is in effect the same as
the Reserve Brigade Commander. The operating expenses for
both the Regiments and CBPAC are shown in Figure 9. The
civilian personnel costs of CBPAC are charged to the Regi-
mental civilian personnel figure by the Navy Finance Office,
San Diego, and are unretrievable as separate figures. This
fact explains the lack of civilian costs for CBPAC. The mili-
tary personnel costs for both staffs are shown in this case
because, just as with the Reserve staffs, these people serve
entirely to support the battalions and thus the individual
Seabee.
A final area of costs is the support provided by the
Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme . All four CBPAC
battalions are homeported there and receive not only organi-
zational space, but also logistics, personnel and other
support. The Center exists solely to support the battalions.
Its expenses for fiscal year 1978 are shown in Figure 10.





CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTER, PORT HUENEME
Operating Costs $ 6,370,026
Civilian Personnel Costs 12,260,192
Military Personnel Costs 3,240,587
Total $ 21,870,805
Number of Personnel Served 3,077
Average Cost Per Person Served $ 7,107.83
thirty per cent of the $23,648.76 needed to support an active
duty Seabee.
D. SUMMARY COMPARISON
Figure 11 is a summary comparison of the total expenses
involved in maintaining both the Reserve Seabee and his
active duty partner. The active duty Seabee is approximately
seven times more expensive to maintain.
The same reports from the Navy Regional Finance Center,
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d Totals $ 3 ,446.92 76
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IV. THE BENEFITS ACCRUING FROM THE RESERVE SEABEE
A. THE RESERVE SEABEE ' S CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL FORCE
This study has shown that the Reserve Seabee is a
financial bargain when compared to the investment required
of the active duty Seabee. Quite obviously, history proves
that the Reserve is a good investment for our country.
However, cost-effectiveness is not the only criteria which
should be considered when examining the worth of an organi-
zation. Equally important is the contribution made by the
Reserve Seabee toward the accomplishment of our national
defense through the Total Force.
The Total Force policy has two main goals. First, to
insure that adequately trained personnel are on hand and
capable of using modern equipment and ready to respond imme-
diately. Secondly, to utilize manpower and material in the
most efficient manner possible in order to get the most for
the taxpayer's military dollar.
The strategy to accomplish these two goals consists of
the creation of a combined active duty and reserve force
which is managed as one and which is concerned with the com-
bat capabilities of the Total Force. This strategy recognizes
that the needs of deterrence, peacetime presence and immediate
response make portions of our defense applicable only to the
active forces. However, essential missions must be assigned
to the Reserve forces and their capabilities honed to
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perfection. The Reserve forces must be trained as actual
elements of the active force. The true test, therefore, of
the worthiness of the Seabee Reserve is its fulfillment of
the Total Force objective.
The Reserve Seabee certainly makes a significant contri-
bution toward the second Total Force goal, lower cost. There
are presently about 6,414 Seabees on active duty, or only
about thirty-one percent of the total active and reserve
construction force of 20,966. The analysis in Chapter Three
showed that it costs approximately $20,201.84 more per year
to maintain the active duty Seabee. Were the 14,552 Reserve
Seabees on active duty, it would cost the country $294,664,038
more per year to maintain the total Seabee force. This cost
becomes even more significant when it is considered that a
Joint Contingency Construction Requirements Study, recently
approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calls for a construc-
tion force level significantly higher than the current com-
gbined force of actives and reserves. Thus, the more
economical Reserve Seabees allow our country to have a greater
construction force — one more nearly the size actually re-
quired by projected emergency requirements — than were all
Seabees required to be on active duty. Our national defense
is significantly stronger because of this fact.
q
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The Reserve Seabees receive equally high marks for their
training accomplishments and combat capabilities. The Naval
Facilities Engineering Command deserves much credit for its
support of the Reserve Seabees. NAVFAC, through its role as
technical program manager for the Seabee Reserve program,
has integrated them into its overall plan and has given them
an opportunity to train and learn as full partners. This
includes providing expertise and on-the-job training oppor-
tunities as well as modern equipment. NAVFAC distributes
all new inventory items to both Reserve and active elements
.
Thus, the training conducted by the Reserve Seabee at his
Permanent Drill Site is with the same equipment being used
by the active duty Seabee. This constant modernization allows
the Reserve Seabees to maintain a high degree of readiness
in anticipation of augmenting the active Seabee forces on
Mobilization Day.
NAVFAC support notwithstanding, the Reserve Seabees are
responsible for planning, developing and supporting their
own training. This training is designed to provide diversi-
fied specialty and condition capabilities which will allow
immediate deployment to any crisis location in the world.
To this end, each Reserve Battalion is required to have a
specialty, such as horizontal construction, in addition to
the primary capability to perform war damage repair, mainte-
nance, operation and construction of critical facilities in
support of Navy and Marine Corps fleet units during the
initial period<.of a contingency. Condition training, such
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as cold weather, jungle, and desert, is required to meet
the "any-where-in-the-world" challenge.
During fiscal year 1978, nine of the seventeen Reserve
battalions received advanced military training; four received
general construction training; three received operational
training, and one received cold weather training. In addi-
tion there were detachments training and working in the
Canal Zone for jungle experience, in Hawaii and Guantanamo
Bay. One battalion also sent detachments to Marine Corps
Base, Twenty-Nine Palms Ca for desert training. By the end
of the fiscal year, four battalions will have completed air
detachment mount-out exercises. These exercises involve
preposition and practice in loading an air detachment
allowance. Each one of the training exercises was witnessed
and reviewed by an inspection team from one of the active
duty Seabee regiments. All exercises were given high marks,
attesting to the general high level of readiness which exists
within the Seabee Reserve. This in turn attests to the
capabilities which it contributes to the Total Force.
B. THE RESERVE SEABEE ' S CONTRIBUTION TO CIVIC AND OTHER
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
An equally significant example of the Reserve Seabees
'
level of expertise and readiness is the construction projects
which are accomplished each year for the civilian community
and for other Department of Defense components. Accomplished
primarily during weekend drill periods, these projects are
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mainly construction which the recipients could not finance
were it not for the free labor provided by the Reserve
Seabees. Construction materials must be provided by the
organization requesting the aid since the Seabees receive
no funds for this purpose. It should also be noted that no
project is undertaken unless it is first approved by the
local trade and craft unions. Any possible conflict with
them is therefore avoided.
Common among the civic projects are work on Boy Scout
or Girl Scout camps, community centers or parks. During
fiscal years 1977 and 1978, the Reserve Seabees built an
entire 4-H camp in Gretna, Nebraska. This project included
planning, site preparation and all construction of buildings
and facilities. The 4-H provided only the materials; the
Reserve Seabees did the rest. In addition to projects for
community groups, the Reserve Seabees did considerable work
for other Department of Defense organizations. During fiscal
year 1977, several detachments worked two months to grade
land and build an airstrip at the Marine Corps Base, Twenty-
Nine Palms . While the Marines could obtain money to purchase
materials, there were no funds in their budget to provide
for actual construction of the strip. Only through the
Reserve Seabees' labor could this project have been accom-
plished. Ranger stations in various National Parks were built
during fiscal year 1977 as well as forty miles of fire break
lines on the Marine Corps Base, Quantico.
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Approximately 350 projects were undertaken by the seven-
teen Reserve Seabee Battalions during 1977. Considering the
numbers of Seabees working on each project and the duration
of their labor, it is estimated that over five million man-
hours were expended by the Reserve Seabees on these projects
during the fiscal year. Costing these man-hours at a conser-
vative $10 per hour rate, it is estimated that at least $50
million of free construction labor was donated to civic and
military groups around the country during fiscal year 1977.
The total cost of maintaining the 14,552 Reserve Seabees
(at $3,446.92 each) is $50,159,580, almost the exact amount
of dollar benefit donated on construction projects during
the year. When it is considered that each of these projects
provides valuable on-the-job training to the Reserve Seabee,
9the worthiness of the organization xs self-evident.
C. BENEFITS OF A RESERVE SEABEE ' S CIVILIAN TRAINING
Most Reserve Seabees work in civilian jobs which are
the same as or comparable to their reserve military assign-
ments. It is significant to note that the training and
experience the Reserve Seabee receives on his job greatly
increases his ability to perform his Seabee tasks. The
construction capabilities of his battalion are increased as
9The information for this section was obtained through





a result. For example, several members of Reserve Naval Mobil
Construction Battalion Thirteen, based at Camp Smith, NY
were employed as workers during the construction of the
World Trade Center in New York City. One of these, a steel-
worker, actually helped assemble the steel superstructure for
the building. Another Reserve Seabee is the foreman of a
highway asphalt application crew in Arizona. A very large
percentage of the 14,552 Reserve Seabees hold civilian posi-
tions requiring similar construction expertise. It is impossi-
ble to calculate the dollar advantage accruing to the Naval
Reserve from this civilian experience and training. This
civilian expertise significantly increases the Reserve Seabee
battalions' professional readiness and general capability
to further the Total Force objectives.
D. THE ACTIVE SEABEE ' S CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL FORCE
It has been shown that the Reserve Seabee costs less
than the active duty Seabee. However, the obvious question
arises as to the comparative amount of output produced by
the two segments of the construction force. Is the amount
of accomplishment per man hour relatively the same or is it
greater or smaller? Only in this way can a true cost-effective
comparison be made. It is now appropriate to examine the
contributions of the active duty Seabee to the Total Force.
The active duty Seabee ' s time is divided between his
homeport — one of the Construction Battalion Centers — and
an overseas deployment site such as Guam, Okinawa or Diego
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Garcia in the Indian Ocean. While in homeport the main
emphasis of the active duty battalions is to undergo hands-
on training for the types of things which they will be doing
on deployment. However, this training is accomplished by
formal training such as A, J and C schools rather than by
actual on-the-job experience. This situation is the result
of strong civilian labor unions in the area of the Construc-
tion Battalion Centers which prevent most of the possible
significant construction projects which might be accomplished
for civic groups and other military organizations . Any such
projects must be low profile such as painting the interior
and exterior of the CBC chapel and constructing cement block
trash enclosures on base. Some major projects are occasion-
ally done at distant military installations such as at
Twenty-Nine Palms where an active duty battalion constructed
a building. Additional training is completed during the
six month in-port period through several military training
exercises and through the participation in beach assault
exercises at Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton. These types
of training prepare the active duty Seabee for his overseas
duties as well as for possible war mobilization. The in-port
period for the active duty Seabee is very similar to the drill
periods completed by the Reserve Seabee. There is, however,




Operations shift to actual construction projects when
the active duty battalion deploys overseas where almost one
hundred percent of the time if spent on jobs ranging from
general repair to new construction. Most of this work is
done for other military organizations even though each
battalion has a number of ongoing projects at its overseas
camp. The four battalions completed approximately 12
projects overseas during fiscal year 1978. Representative
of these is the repair and renovation of the enlisted barracks
at the Naval Air Station, Atsugi, Japan. The Seabees ripped
out the interior of these barracks and replaced all plumbing
and wiring as well as completely reconstructing the interior.
A more complicated project is the reconstruction of the Navy
pier on Okinawa. The wooden and steel piles are being com-
pletely replaced and the pier totally remodeled. In all,
it is estimated that each active duty battalion will have
expended approximately 67,000 mandays of labor during fiscal
year 1978. This figure compares to the approximate 36,765





A. THE CASE FOR STRENGTHENING OTHER NAVAL RESERVE UNITS
This study has focused on the cost benefits of the Naval
Reserve Seabee. It was discovered that the Reserve Seabee
costs only about one-seventh the amount required to maintain
a Seabee on active duty. Nevertheless, through intensive
training planned to provide a variety of specialty and con-
ditional experience, the Reserve Seabees have proven them-
selves to have a high degree of combat readiness. This training
has been supplemented by on-the-job projects for civilian and
military organizations, the total labor value of which equals
or exceeds the yearly maintenance costs of the Reserve Seabee
organization. It was pointed out that additional training
expertise is gained by most Reserve Seabees in their civilian
jobs, which are similar to their military assignments. All
these factors contribute to a high degree of mobilization
readiness which has made the Total Force concept a reality
within the construction forces of the United States.
The Reserve Seabee organization is in some respects
unique, a factor which accounts in part for the high degree
of cost effectiveness accruing from this group. However,
there are other units in our Naval Reserve which display many
of these same positive factors. The Naval Reserve Air
Community is one such example. Also reorganized five years
ago, it is now comprised of squadrons that are duplicates of
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their fleet counterparts. It has enjoyed greater stability
than the Naval Reserve in general, primarily because its
hardware exists outside that of the fleet aircraft inventory —
much like the Reserve Seabee equipment allowance, although in
some instances, Reserve aircraft are not up-to-date. It is
a striking example of the hardware-oriented type of Naval
Reserve which the Total Force Navy requires. Due to the
large number of Vietnam veteran pilots who are now members of
the Air Reserve, many Reserve tactical squadrons have a signi-
ficantly higher level of combat experience than their fleet
counterparts. Also, a large percentage of Naval Air Reser-
vists are commercial pilots in their civilian jobs, thereby
bringing a high level of training and current experience with
them to their military assignments.
The Air Reserve has been assigned specific missions which
keeps it ready. Four Reserve air transport squadrons provide
airlift support and Reserve requirements with a fleet of
thirty C-118 transport aircraft. An affiliation program has
led to the establishment of two Naval Air Reserve Force squa-
drons employing six newly acquired C-9 jet transports. These
types of missions significantly increase the contribution of
"Guard and Reserve in the Total Force Program,"





the Air Reserve to the Total Force and contribute to their
cost effectiveness.
Similar 'conditions exist within the Naval Reserve Program
11 subspecialty programs such as medicine and law. Highly
trained and skilled in their civilian jobs, these professionals
report to Naval Reserve duty capable of performing any job
assignment given them. Only military training is required
to bring them to full mobilization readiness. The Navy uti-
lizes their expertise in providing medical checkups and care
or legal service, both to drilling Reservists and active
duty personnel. Recently, a team of Reserve lawyers from
the San Diego Readiness Command were formed into a team to
provide legal services to active duty personnel stationed at
Reserve Centers throughout the Command. Serving mainly during
the yearly two-weeks' training periods, this legal team
provides a model for the creative use of Naval Reservists
to benefit and augment the active fleet. Each such assign-
ment contributes to improved cost effectiveness of the Naval
Reserve
.
B. ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES OF SERVICE
Many enlightened individuals in our society have for some
time tried to focus public attention on the lack of civil
defense in this country. They point out that there is no
viable plan of action to be followed in case of nuclear
attack nor is the general public aware of what precautions
or actions it should take in an emergency. This state of
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affairs is more alarming when the extensive civil defense
plans of some other nations are considered. The Soviet Union
has a sophisticated civil defense plan which has been supported
through extensive public facilities and educational programs
for the Soviet citizens. This country has very little of
either.
One possible plan to develop an adequate civil defense in
our country is to utilize the Reserve Seabees in developing
and implementing a civil protection program. For several
years the CEC was the primary military organization charged
with civil defense planning, construction and public safety and
many Seabee's as well as other Naval Reservists have gone
through training programs in Civil Defense. Several factors
make the Reserve Seabees especially suited for such public
service. Their military training, especially in support of
amphibious assault and landings, has given them valuable
experience in moving men and equipment which could be trans-
ferred to personnel evacuation. Their construction expertise
would allow them to clear damage or to provide shelter as
the need arose. And their skills at organization and manage-
ment — as evidenced by their own organization — would seemingly
make them highly suited to devising and carrying out such a
plan. This proposal must not be carried out, however, at the
dilution of their combat readiness and training. Only
through maintenance of these capabilities is our Total Force —
and our national defense — a workable policy.
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C. THREATS TO NAVAL RESERVE SEABEE EFFECTIVENESS
Today's Naval Reserve Seabee Force is continually faced
with problems which threaten the effectiveness of the organi-
zation. One such threat comes from within the military. A
few analysts in both the Department of the Navy and the
Department of Defense have suggested reducing the number of
Reserve Seabee battalions from seventeen to eight. They
reason that in time of crisis, personnel from the civilian
construction industry could be conscripted as necessary. They
overlook both the failure of this type of construction force
in World War II and the fact that civilians would be untrained
in military matters and not prepared for combat conditions
as is the Reserve Seabee. After three years, proponents of
this reduction plan are still intent on seeing it carried
out in spite of the OP-605 study released during 1977 which
called for more than seventeen Reserve Seabee battalions.
During this time, the Reserve Seabee Force has been forced to
spend much time defending itself before Congress, thereby
reducing its concentration on training and readiness. An
additional external threat comes from a Congress which is
constantly pressured to institute people-related government
programs. One result of this condition has been a reduction
in funding for all military organizations and a commensurate
decrease in our national defense. During the last seven
years, the percentage of our country's budget spent on defense
has decreased while the Soviet Union has significantly increased
its defense expenditures. It is hoped this paper will help
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convince military planners and Congressmen of the strategic
and financial value of a healthy Naval Reserve Seabee Force.
The evidence obtained and cited in this paper appears
to the author to be ample justification for support of the
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